

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓	3	
2	DDCI		✓	4	
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		✓		
5	DDI		✓	5	
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL				
16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA	2 ✓			
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/LA/DDO		✓	6	
21	NIO/LA		✓	7	
22	D/LA/DDI		✓	8	

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

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Date

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NSC review completed.

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91510****THE WHITE HOUSE****WASHINGTON**

December 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ**The Secretary of State****SUBJECT: Next Steps in Central America (C)**

Please commend those who worked so hard to produce the paper at Tab A. They have succeeded in identifying most of the key issues which must be addressed during the next 6-12 months in our Central American strategy. (S)

Before moving this to the NSPG, however, we should ensure that we provide the President with our thinking on the following which must be included in our overall implementation plan: (S)

-- U.S. Diplomatic Objectives, Strategy, and Timing: The paper should include an overall plan which permits us to recover the diplomatic initiative in Central America currently held by the Sandinistas and the FMLN/FDR. This diplomatic plan should include actions in bilateral diplomacy, with the Contadora participants, the OAS, and the UN. We need to ensure that the NSPG principals and the President are fully conversant with our diplomatic approach. (TS)

-- Legislative Strategy: The initiatives called for in the paper will require Congressional support. The paper should outline how we plan to proceed and call for a detailed legislative strategy. We should indicate how we will integrate the National Bipartisan Commission report with our plans for a significantly increased funding profile for the region. (S)

-- Public Diplomacy: A detailed plan needs to be developed for an active program to convince European and Latin American social democratic leaders, as well as the Mexican Government, to reduce or eliminate their support for the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas. The developing Nicaraguan/Cuban "peace" campaign mandates that we develop new bases of support for our policies in the region. Resources need to be identified for this effort. (S)

-- Military Activities: The paper must include plans for military activities in the region as a coherent part of our overall strategy. AMHAUS TARA II will begin to phase out in early February 1984, just as the communists increase their political and military offensive to counter the March 25 election in El Salvador. Our plans for a military presence in the region, subsequent exercises, bases, and military support for humanitarian relief should be identified. (TS)

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There is also some concern that the introduction to the paper presents an overly optimistic view of the current situation. We need to ensure that those who review the paper do not adopt the perspective that we are on the eve of victory. It may be useful to include a brief intelligence summary of the situation and the views of the Hondurans, Costa Ricans, Venezuelans, etc. in the introduction. (TS)

In order to move this paper and the process forward, it is proposed that we proceed as follows: (C)

- On January 3, that Ken Dam chair a SIG at the Deputy Secretary level to review the paper and discuss establishing an appropriate mechanism for coordinating the diplomatic, military, economic, covert action, and informational aspects of implementation. (TS)
- At COB January 4, distribution of the final paper to NSPG principals for review. (C)
- On the morning of January 6, that the President receive the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. (C)
- In the afternoon of January 6, that the NSPG meet to review the strategy paper in the context of the NBCCA report. (C)

If all goes according to plan, we should be able to provide an implementing National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) to the departments and agencies by COB January 11, 1984.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


for Robert C. McFarlane

cc: The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
The Secretary of Defense

The Honorable William J. Casey
The Director of Central Intelligence

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

Tab. A - State Department Paper of December 20, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TO: _____

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Executive Secretary

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